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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine Rick is fifteen years old. After leaving school one day,
he joins his friends and heads down to the local grocery store. On a
dare, he shoves a bag boy and steals thirty dollars from an open cash
register, but is caught running out the door. The prosecutor assigned
to Rick's case decides to prosecute him in adult criminal court, which
she is permitted to do under a state statute. Rick is convicted as an
adult of felony robbery, but sentenced to serve his time in a facility
that houses fifteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. Rick spends one year and
one month in the facility.
After staying out of trouble for a few years, Rick is again
arrested when he is nineteen, this time charged with possession with
intent to deliver marijuana. He is prosecuted as an adult and
sentenced to serve three years in the same facility as before. A few
years after his release, Rick sells cocaine to a federal agent near a
housing project and is indicted on a number of drug-related charges.
He is convicted of this federal crime.
When sentencing Rick for this most recent crime, the district
court judge turns to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"). Considering Rick's two previous arrests, the judge
determines that Rick is a "career offender" and is thus eligible for the
commensurate sentencing enhancement.' Because he stole thirty
dollars when he was fifteen, and even though he served his sentence
among other juveniles, Rick's sentence is enhanced from ten years to
thirty. Instead of getting out of prison at age thirty five, he will be
over fifty five.
Rick's situation is not as unbelievable as one may think. The
facts of this hypothetical loosely mirror a recent Seventh Circuit case, 2
and similarly predicated sentencing enhancements have been upheld
by the Third and Ninth Circuits. 3 All three circuits reasoned that
adult convictions stemming from crimes committed before the age of
eighteen can count toward the career offender sentencing provisions of
the Guidelines ("Career Offender Guidelines"), regardless of whether
the prior sentence was served in a juvenile facility. 4 The Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits stand in opposition; they apply the Career Offender

1.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 411.1 (2012).
2.
United States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964, 965-66 (7th Cir. 2010).
3.
United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Carrillo,
991 F.2d 590, 591 (9th Cir. 1993).
4.
E.g., Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967-68 (holding that the location of where a sentence is
served is "unimportant;"what matters is "the nature of the underlying conviction").
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Guidelines by inquiring into the nature of the sentence served.5 If a
prior conviction resulted in a sentence served in a juvenile facility,
this conviction cannot be counted toward a career offender
determination.6
At first blush, it may seem more just to adopt the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits' interpretation of the Guidelines, but the full scope
of the problem is more complicated. How would the Fourth Circuit, for
example, characterize Rick's first two sentences, served in a facility
that houses both juveniles and adults? What if Rick had been in a
jurisdiction that altogether prohibited adult courts from sentencing
offenders to juvenile confinement facilities? Discrepancies among the
states mean that similar offenses may lead to completely different
convictions and sentences. 7 Adopting the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits' approach does not provide a uniform resolution to the
problems arising with these types of enhancements.
This Note looks beyond the circuit split to the larger juvenile
justice issues implicated by these sentencing practices. Part II
provides a brief overview of the juvenile justice system, juvenile
transfer statutes, and the Guidelines. Part III explores the
interpretive issues that have led to this circuit split. Part IV explains
why resolving this circuit split requires more than choosing one side,
and expands the discussion by analyzing the impact of recent judicial
and scientific trends on the treatment of juvenile offenders in the
adult system. Part V proposes that convictions occurring before the
age of eighteen should not be factored into a career offender
enhancement, regardless of the nature of the conviction or sentence.
Ultimately, this solution creates a judicially manageable rule
supported by Supreme Court precedent, state law, and the overall
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system.
II. TENSION WITHOUT RELEASE: A BRIEF LOOK AT JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE TRANSFER STATUTES, AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

A discussion of these sentencing practices begins with
recognizing the complexity of issues involved in the intersection of the
juvenile and adult judicial systems. There is a fundamental tension

5.
United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 561-62 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pinion,
4 F.3d 941, 944 (11th Cir. 1993).
6.
Mason, 284 F.3d at 944-45.
7.
See infra Part IV.A (discussing in more detail some of these state-to-state differences

and how they affect this circuit split).
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between the goals of the juvenile justice system, the existence of
transfer statutes allowing juveniles to be tried in adult court, and the
often-harsh nature of adult federal sentencing enhancements. By
establishing this baseline tension, we can better understand not only
this circuit split, but also the nuanced approach to juvenile justice
recently taken by the Supreme Court. Section A provides a brief
history of the juvenile justice system, Section B discusses trends in
juvenile transfer laws, and Section C explains the Career Offender
Guidelines.
A. A Brief History of Juvenile Justice
The first juvenile court system was established in 1899 with
the aim to rehabilitate those young offenders deemed less culpable
than their adult counterparts.8 Until the early nineteenth century,
American criminal courts punished juveniles and adults in much the
same way,9 and it was not until the Progressive era that the idea of
juvenile courts gained traction.10 Changes in ideological assumptions
about both crime and social constructions supported this movement."
Criminologists and social scientists alike began to embrace
rehabilitation as the proper treatment for young offenders in an effort
to isolate and rectify the newly identified "antecedent causes of
criminal behavior." 12 Additionally, new theories about social
development framed adolescence as a distinct stage before adulthood,
leading to the increasingly accepted view that children were less
culpable and needed preparation for life. 13
The first juvenile proceedings were not adversarial; rather, the
state acted as parens patriae, reinforcing parental authority and
control over juveniles while making discretionary determinations on
their behalf. 14 The state would seek "not so much to punish as to

8.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967); see also Melanie Deutsch, Note, Minor League
Offenders Strike Out in the Major League: California'sImproper Use of Juvenile Adjudications as
Strikes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2008) (providing further detail on the history of the juvenile
justice system and these early courts).
9.
BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 2 (3d ed.
2009).
10. Id. at 1, 3.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.

14. Joseph I. Goldstein-Breyer, Calling Strikes Before He Stepped to the Plate: Why
Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Be Used to Enhance Subsequent Adult Sentences, 15
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 65, 66 (2010).

NOT-SO-SWEET SIXTEEN

2013]

1313

reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop."15 For
example, a juvenile offender was characterized as a "delinquent," not a
"criminal," preserving the possibility of rehabilitation and signifying a
lower degree of culpability.16 The state placed juvenile offenders under
its "care and solicitude," not under arrest or on trial." But in return
for a court which focused on their best interests, early juvenile
offenders received minimal constitutional protections.' 8
In its landmark 1967 opinion, In re Gault, the Supreme Court
clarified this constitutional gray area by imposing certain procedural
safeguards on juvenile proceedings. 19 The Court observed that
"unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure." 20 Fearing that parens
patriae would promote procedural arbitrariness, the Court held that
the rights to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation, and crossexamination, as well as the privilege against self-incrimination, were
all essential to the juvenile justice system. 2 1 Four years later,
however, the Court held that the right to a jury did not attach to
juvenile proceedings, reasoning that the presence of a jury would
recast the juvenile proceeding in a decidedly adversarial light, and in
so doing, detract from its rehabilitative purpose. 22 In order to protect a
juvenile system that "eschew[s] blameworthiness and punishment"
against encroachment from an adult system based upon retribution,
the Court has interpreted due process requirements differently in each
system. 23
But the Supreme Court has also looked beyond the mere
distinction between rehabilitation and retribution. In three recent
cases, the Court recognized an extensive and nuanced distinction
between young offenders and their adult counterparts, and used this
difference to strike down both the juvenile death penalty and juvenile
life without parole. 24 Focusing on issues such as developmental
15.
16.
17.

Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23 (1967).
Id. at 15.

18. Id. at 17; see also Alissa Malzman, Note, Juvenile Strikes: Unconstitutional Under
Apprendi and Blakely and Incompatible with the Rehabilitative Ideal, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 171, 175 (2005) (reiterating this point and providing more information on its
relationship to the rehabilitative ideal).

19.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.

20.

Id. at 18.

21.

See generally id.

22. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
23. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
24. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole on two juvenile offenders who
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differences and reduced culpability, the Court has clearly not forgotten
the roots of the juvenile justice system.25
B. Juvenile Transfer
Despite the arguments for their special treatment, juvenile
offenders are not always processed through the juvenile justice
system. In every state, such offenders can be transferred to adult
courts, removing them from a system catered to their unique
characteristics and placing them among the general population of
offenders. This mechanism makes juvenile offenders eligible for adult
convictions and sentences, and gives rise to the circuit split discussed
below. This intersection of the juvenile and adult systems is crucial to
understanding why this circuit split implicates larger issues.
Transfer can be effected through a number of different judicial
and legislative mechanisms. Some jurisdictions give the juvenile court
judge transfer authority ("judicial waiver"); others give the prosecutor
discretion to file certain cases in either system ("concurrent
jurisdiction"); and some state statutes exclude certain offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction altogether ("statutory exclusion").26
Furthermore, many states have "once an adult, always an adult"
provisions, requiring that juveniles who have been tried as adults will
continue to be tried as adults for any subsequent offenses. 27 The
Supreme Court has only weighed in on the constitutionality of these
procedures once, almost fifty years ago in Kent v. United States.28 In
considering the first of these three methods of transfer (judicial
waiver), the Kent Court determined that a transfer from juvenile to
adult court was a "critically important" event and held that a juvenile
was entitled to a hearing before transfer was effected. 29

committed homicides); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide and, further, that the states must give a juvenile nonhomicide offender a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding
unconstitutional the execution of individuals who were under eighteen when they committed
their capital crimes).
See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (identifying developmental differences between
25.
juveniles and adults).
26. See HOWARD N. SNYDER AND MELISSA SICKMUND, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 110 (2006) (providing a good background on

these three main sources of transfer).
27. Id. (noting that as of 2006, thirty-four states had such provisions).
28. 383 U.S. 541, 557-65 (1966).
29. Id. at 557, 561 (holding only applied to a particular District of Columbia transfer
statute, in the context of juvenile-judge determined transfers).
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Kent laid out eight determinative factors to be weighed by a
judge when considering juvenile transfer, including the seriousness of
the offense, the maturity of the offender, and the possibility of
rehabilitation. 30 Some states have incorporated these factors into
legislation, 31 while others have added new criteria. 32 Presumably, this
emphasis on maturity and rehabilitation is a nod toward two of the
major tenets of the juvenile justice system 33 and suggests that a
transferred offender would not benefit from this system.
But states have recently been moving away from Kent and
promulgating transfer practices that prioritize retribution over
rehabilitation. 3 4 This shift occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, as
fear of the juvenile "super predator"-a term often used by the media
to describe a growing generation of young violent criminalspopularized maxims such as "old enough to do the crime, old enough to
do the time." 35 Rising youth homicide and gun violence rates led many
states to question the goals of juvenile justice. States enacted new
laws making it easier to transfer juvenile offenders and began to
prosecute larger numbers of juveniles in adult court. 36 Such state
legislation increased the number of eligible charges, the original
jurisdiction of the adult courts, and the discretionary powers of the
prosecutor to file in adult court. 37 As recently as 2009, for example,

30. Id. at 566-67. The factors in their entirety are: (1) the seriousness of the offense;
(2) whether the offense was premeditated, willful, or aggressively violent; (3) whether the offense
was against persons or property, with greater weight given to those against persons; (4) whether
there is enough evidence for the Grand Jury to pass an indictment; (5) desirability of trying the
entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the offense are adults; (6)
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile, determined by environmental and emotional
evidence; (7) juvenile's prior history with trouble; and (8) the prospects for protecting the public
and the likelihood of rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Id.
31. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556 (West 2013) (using a condensed version of the same
eight factors).
32. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518 (West 2012) (taking into account the juvenile's
use of a weapon).
33. Those two being the reduced culpability of an adolescent and the possibility for
rehabilitation.
34. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly
Revisionist History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (providing a brief history of transfer
statutes and their recent trends of the 1990s).
35. See FELD, supra note 9, at 29-30 (discussing the historical background of the 1960s1990s that gave way to this increased fear of the juvenile criminal).
36. Id. at 30; see also Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court
and the Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1502-23 (2003) (summarizing the
context in which the states enacted "get tough" statutory reforms).
37. See Zimring, supra note 34, at 6 (breaking down the types of transfer legislation
enacted during the 1990s).
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almost half of the states did not require a minimum age for transfer.18
Generally, the justifications for this recent shift have focused more on
the nature of the offense than the particular characteristics of the
offender, overlooking the developmental differences and diminished
culpability of many juvenile offenders. 39
Judicial and political scrutiny of these new transfer laws is
both rare and, when it occurs, narrow in scope. 40 Kent's holding was
limited to judicial waiver laws and has been easily circumvented both
by statutes that limit the overall jurisdiction of juvenile courts and by
prosecutors armed with discretion to file directly in adult criminal
court. 4 1 Challenges to juvenile transfer laws on constitutional grounds
have been mostly unsuccessful, 42 and most judges have merely
deferred to state legislatures when evaluating transfer statutes. 43
Moreover, politicians are wary of advocating more juvenile-friendly
transfer statutes for fear of appearing weak on crime. 44 And while this
expansion of transfer laws has slowed since the turn of the century,45
juvenile transfer is a much simpler prospect now than it was fifty
years ago.
C. FederalSentencing Guidelines and the CareerOffender
Once in the adult system, juvenile offenders become eligible for
the Guidelines, including sentencing enhancements for career

38. Statistical Briefing Book, Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process:Juveniles Tried
as Adults, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Apr. 22, 2011), http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
structure_process/qa04105.asp?qaDate=2009.
39. See Feld, supranote 36, at 1503 (going into more depth on this point).
40. See Zimring, supra note 34, at 2-4 (describing the waiver of serious cases into a
criminal court as "practice in search of a theory," and arguing that many cases embrace transfer
to indict the juvenile justice system, leading to a lack of "probing analysis" in judicial opinions
about transfer).
41. See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71
LA. L. REV. 99, 144-48 (2010) (providing a great overview of the effects of Kent, the deference of
the courts to legislation that punishes youth without constraint, and the relative lack of success
of the challenges brought against transfer laws).
42. See, e.g., State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 672-73 (Conn. 1998) (holding that
prosecutorial discretion statutes do not violate the separation of powers doctrine because one of a
prosecutor's core functions is determining which cases to prosecute, and choosing where to
prosecute flows from that principle).
43. Arya, supra note 41, at 145.
44. See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the
Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1497-98 (2008) (discussing the effects of sensational
news coverage on juvenile crime, often leading to more punitive reforms and thus
disincentivizing any attempt to create more lenient juvenile laws).
45. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 26, at 113 (observing that the rapid expansion of
transfer laws in the 1980s and 1990s has somewhat slowed more recently).
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offenders. These harsh penalties-especially the Career Offender
Guidelines-are supported less by rehabilitation or developmental
differences than by retribution and deterrence. 46
The Career Offender Guidelines originated from an unusually
explicit statutory directive from Congress to the independent United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), 4 7 as part of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.48 Specifically, Congress instructed the
Commission to create sentencing guidelines that imposed sentences
"at or near the maximum term authorized" for defendants previously
convicted of one or more enumerated types of felonies. 49 This diverged
from the more conventional guideline-development process, which
required the Commission to consider average pre-Guidelines
sentences. 0
As a result of these congressional demands, repeat offenders
saw significantly longer sentences after the Guidelines than before.51
For example, a criminal convicted of trafficking five grams of crack
before the Guidelines would have received a sentence averaging
twenty-seven to thirty-three months; under the Career Offender
Guidelines, this criminal could serve from 262 months to life.5 2 In
addition, the Commission went beyond its statutory directive by
broadening the type of felonies that would count toward the
enhancement, most notably including several drug offenses that

46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012)
(identifying one of the rationales behind the Career Offender Guidelines as the limited likelihood
of rehabilitation); see also United States v. Carrillo, 991 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that especially punitive career offender enhancements are justified because repeat offenders are
likely beyond the reach of rehabilitation).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (2006).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (specifying the inclusion of a "crime of violence" or "an offense
described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 1005,
and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959),
and chapter 705 of title 46").
50. See AMY BARON-EVANS ET AL., DECONSTRUCTING THE CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINE 11
(2011), available at http://www.fd.org/navigation/select-topics-in-criminal-defense/sentencingresources/supporting-pages/deconstructing-the-career-offender-guideline (providing an extensive
empirical and policy analysis of the development and implementation of the Career Offender
Guidelines).

51.

Id. at 5-7.

52. Id. at 2. The chart contained in this report also notes that an individual caught with
fifty grams of heroin before the Guidelines would have received a sentence averaging 37-46
months; as a career offender under the Guidelines, this criminal would serve between 210-262
months. Id. Furthermore, a pre-Guidelines 37-46 month sentence for a $2,000 bank robbery
turned into a 210-262 month sentencing range under the Guidelines. Id.
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Congress did not originally intend to have included. 53 In a 2004 report,
the Commission itself even acknowledged that the Career Offender
Guidelines led to some of the most severe sentences, questioning
whether they promoted important sentencing goals.5 *
Though acknowledging the severity of these enhancements, the
Commission continues to promulgate the Career Offender Guidelines
and justifies them5 5 through reference to Congress's enumerated
sentencing purposes.56 First, a repeat offender is more culpable than a
first-time offender, and thus deserving of greater punishment.57
Second, repeated criminal behavior aggravates the need for strict
sentences that will serve as a deterrent.58 Third, the recidivism
demonstrated by repeat offenders requires increased incapacitation to
protect the public.59 Finally, repeat offenders are all but beyond
rehabilitation, and thus this consideration should have limited impact
on sentencing.60
The main guideline for career offenders is found under § 4B1.1
of the U.S. Code, which provides the general requirements for the
sentencing enhancement. A defendant is a career offender if (1) he was
at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the most recent
crime, (2) his most recent crime is a felony that is either a "crime of
violence" or a "controlled substance offense," and (3) he has at least
two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled- substance offense. 61 Having satisfied these requirements, a
defendant is given the highest possible "criminal history"

53. See id. at 11 (explaining that the Commission: (1) included certain drug offenses not
listed in the statute; (2) adopted a broader definition of "crime of violence" than intended by
Congress; and (3) included offenses that were not considered felonies by Congress). Note how this
coincides with the increase in juvenile transfer laws discussed above. See supra Part II.B.
HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
54.
AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 133-34 (2004).

55. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012) (laying
out the policy rationales behind the Career Offender Guidelines).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (stating the purposes for imposing criminal sentences: (1)
to provide just punishment for the offense; (2) to adequately deter criminal conduct; (3) to protect
the public; and (4) to provide rehabilitative correctional treatment).
57. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012)
(describing the purposes for criminal sentencing).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 4B1.1(a).
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enhancement for the most recent conviction, effectively authorizing
the statutory maximum sentence. 62
The subsequent provision-§ 4B1.2-delineates which prior
convictions can be used in a career offender determination. 63 The
Commission defines a "prior felony conviction" as an adult federal or
state conviction whose potential punishment exceeds one year,
regardless of whether the offense is actually designated a felony. 64 A
juvenile can receive an adult conviction only if the "laws of the
jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted" classify it as an
adult conviction.65 Thus, this guideline permits federal courts to defer
to state-law categorization when necessary.66
Section 4A1.2(d) specifically addresses which offenses
committed prior to the age of eighteen can be later counted against a
defendant, shifting the focus from the conviction to the sentence
received.67 This guideline distinguishes prior adult convictions that led
to "sentence[s] of imprisonment" from an "adult or juvenile sentence"
that resulted in "confinement." 68 The Guidelines treat the former more
seriously than the latter.69 The commentary to this guideline goes into
greater detail, noting that it will only count those offenses that
resulted in: (1) an "adult sentence of imprisonment" exceeding one
year and one month; or (2) an adult or juvenile sentence, or release
from confinement on that sentence, within five years of committing
the instant offense. 70

62. Id. There are six criminal history categories, reflecting the seriousness of previous
transgressions. Id. § 4A1.1(a). The lowest level is Category I, which will not enhance the baseline
sentence for the instant offense; Category VI is the highest, and imposes the most punitive
enhancement. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
63. Id. § 411.2. For example, a "crime of violence" means, among other things, any offense
punishable by a prison term exceeding one year that includes the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force, or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives,
or otherwise involves certain other risky conduct. Id. § 4B1.2(a). A "controlled substance offence"
includes the manufacture, import, export, distribution, dispensing or possession of a controlled or
counterfeit substance. Id. § 4B1.2(b). Note that both state and federal offenses count under these
definitions. Id.
64. Id. at cmt. 1.
65. Id.
66. This becomes important when considering the move away from the harms of potential
state-law discrepancies in § 4A1.2.
67. Id. § 4A1.2(d)
68. Id. § 4AL2(d)(1)-(2).
69. Id. (noting that an adult "sentence of imprisonment" that exceeded one year and one
month adds three points to the criminal history determination, while an adult or juvenile
sentence to "confinement" adds one or two points, depending on how long the sentence was and
when it occurred).
70. Id. at cmt. 7.
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The Commission justifies the provisions of § 4A1.2 as avoiding
sentencing discrepancies, 7 1 an overall goal of the Guidelines.72 By
confining the nature of predicate offenses, the Commission limits the
universe within which the sentencing judge can operate and avoids
discrepancies that arise when attempting to track down juvenile
adjudications across differing state-law jurisdictions. 73 In further
support of this purpose, the Commission applies § 4A1.2 to all offenses
committed prior to age eighteen, regardless of the age at which a
defendant is no longer considered a "juvenile" in a particular
jurisdiction. 74
III. VERY LITTLE GUIDANCE: A CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER JUVENILE
SENTENCES AND THE CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINES

Although an express purpose of the Guidelines is to avoid
sentencing discrepancies, 75 the Courts of Appeals have nonetheless
varied in determining if certain offenses committed prior to age
eighteen count toward a career offender determination.7 6 Specifically,
the circuit courts are split as to whether the conviction of a juvenile in
adult court, leading to a sentence served in a juvenile facility, can
count as a predicate offense under the Career Offender Guidelines. 77
When similar convictions have led to sentences served in adult
facilities, the circuits agree that this can legitimately count as a

71.

Id.

72. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006) (noting that one of the major purposes of the Guidelines is
to "avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct"). Interestingly, another purpose of the Guidelines
is "to reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it
relates to the criminal justice process," an issue that will be discussed in Part III of this Note
when addressing changes in juvenile psychology and neuroscience. § 991(b)(1)(c).
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2, cmt. n.7 (2012).
74.

Id.

75. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (outlining the three purposes of the Sentencing Commission and
the Guidelines).
76. Compare United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to count one
such prior conviction as a predicate felony to a career offender determination), with United
States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the use of a similar felony for a career
offender determination).
77. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 968; Mason 284 F.3d at 562; see also Cassandra S. Shaffer,
Comment, Inequality Within the United States Sentencing Guidelines: The Use of Sentences
Given to Juveniles by Adult Criminal Court as Predicate Offenses for the Career Offender

Provision,8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 172-75 (2002) (providing an excellent breakdown of
this circuit split).
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predicate offense under the Guidelines.78 But when the sentence is
served in a juvenile facility, the circuits are split over how to interpret
and reconcile the conviction-specific language of § 4B1.2 and the
sentence-specific language of § 4A1.2. 79 Simply put, this difference in
opinion revolves around whether or not the Guidelines distinguish
between adult and juvenile convictions, as well as adult and juvenile
sentences.80

A. The Nature of the Conviction Alone
The Ninth Circuit was one of the first to address this issue
when it refused to read an additional "nature of the sentence"
requirement into the Guidelines.81 The court in United States v.
Carrillo reasoned that the Commission's use of "adult sentences of
imprisonment" in note 7 of § 4A1.2 was merely a shorthand reference
to a defendant who was "'convicted as an adult and received a
sentence of imprisonment,' " not a way to distinguish between socalled "adult" and "juvenile sentences."82 The court further
emphasized that a "juvenile sentence" only referred to confinements
resulting from juvenile adjudications.83 Under this reading, any
conviction taking place in an adult criminal court would count toward
a career offender determination, regardless of where the ensuing
sentence was served and contingent upon meeting the other two
requirements of § 4B1.1. Though minors convicted as adults may be
sentenced to juvenile facilities with the hopes of rehabilitation, the
court reasoned that they should not be rewarded after developing into
repeat offenders. 84
The Third Circuit adopted a similar approach, focusing on the
nature of the conviction and reasoning that "where or for how long the
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hazelett, 32 F.3d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
conviction as an adult for an offense committed at age seventeen satisfied the Guideline
requirements as a predicate offense for a career offender).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2004) (implicitly
acknowledging the importance of commentary note 1 to § 4B1.2 when it refused to adopt a
reading of § 4A1.2 that might contradict it).
80. See, e.g., Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967 (providing a breakdown of the genesis behind this
circuit split, and ultimately siding against the Fourth Circuit's belief that the Guidelines
intended to distinguish between types of sentences).
81. United States v. Carrillo, 991 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that a different
reading would "ignore the plain language of § 4A1.2(d)" and would imply that the commentary
and Guidelines were inconsistent).
82. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2012)).
83.

Id.

84. Id. at 595; see also Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967 (noting that juveniles who persist in a "life
of crime" deserve stricter sentences).
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defendant is actually sentenced is of no import."85 The court in United
States v. Moorer emphasized the conviction-specific language of note 1
to § 4B1.2, which defines a "prior felony conviction" solely in terms of
the defendant's prior conviction and without reference to his
sentence.86 Addressing the sentence-specific language of note 7 to §
4A1.2(d), the court adopted the reasoning of Carrillo and further held
that reading this note to require an inquiry into the sentence would be
inconsistent with the focus on conviction in note 1 to § 4B1.2. 87
The Seventh Circuit adopted this "nature of the conviction"
approach in United States v. Gregory, upholding the use of a thirtydollar robbery to enhance the defendant's sentence from roughly 130
to 327 months under the Career Offender Guidelines.88 The defendant,
Isaiah Gregory, was only fifteen at the time of the robbery and, though
sentenced to a juvenile facility, was convicted in an adult court.89
Echoing Moorer,90 the court reasoned that the location of the sentence
was unimportant and relied entirely on the nature of the underlying
conviction. 91 The court also held that if the Commission had intended
to create such a sharp distinction between the nature of the sentences
served, it would have done so with more clarity than the subtle
linguistic differences between § 4B1.2 and § 4A1.2. 92 Finally, the court
reinforced the policy concerns of Carrillo, reasoning that providing
leniency to repeat offenders beyond the reach of rehabilitation defeats
the punitive purpose of the Career Offender Guidelines. 93
B. Expanding To Consider the Nature of the Sentence
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has taken a more
expansive approach to this issue, not only focusing on the type of
conviction, but also inquiring into the nature of the sentence
received. 94 In United States v. Pinion,the court grappled with a South
85.
86.
87.

United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 168.

88.

591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010).

89. Id. at 965.
90. 383 F.3d at 941.
91.
Gregory, 591 F.3d at 968.
92. Id. at 967.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941, 944 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that,
notwithstanding South Carolina's treatment of criminal defendants under age twenty-five as
"youthful offenders," a previous conviction at age seventeen was still predicate to a career
offender determination because: (1) he was convicted in adult court; (2) received an adult
sentence; and (3) served this adult sentence).
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Carolina law that treated all criminal defendants under the age of
twenty-five as "youthful offenders."95 When considering whether one of
the defendant's prior offenses-committed when he was seventeenshould have factored into a career offender determination, the court
sought to determine whether the conviction and the sentence were
"adult."96 The court held that both the conviction and sentence
satisfied the plain language of § 4A1.2 as "adult,"97 and like the court
in Carrillo,98 it reasoned that the defendant further deserved this
enhancement because of his unwillingness and inability to
rehabilitate.99
The Fourth Circuit expanded this approach in United States v.
Mason, striking down a career offender enhancement because a
predicate conviction had resulted in a juvenile detention. 00
Interpreting the Guidelines' text, the court noted that use of the term
"imprisonment" could only refer to a sentence served in an adult
facility.101 Supporting this reading, the court noted that § 4A1.2(d)(1)
uses the term "imprisonment" when discussing adult convictions,
while § 4A1.2(d)(2) uses the term "confinement" in reference to both
juvenile and adult dispositions.1 0 2 Since note 7 stipulates that only
"adult sentences of imprisonment" should be counted as predicate, the
court reasoned that the use of any conviction that resulted in a
juvenile confinement violated the Guidelines.1 03 Because the
defendant had been sentenced to a juvenile facility under West
Virginia law, the court held that this could not be used as one of two
predicate offenses to a career offender enhancement.104 Delving deeper
into the statute's text than the court did in Pinion, the Mason court
came to the same conclusion: a prior offense can only be used against a
defendant if it resulted in both an adult conviction and an adult
sentence.105

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 944-45.

97. Id. at 945. Without much explanation, the court bolstered its reasoning by looking to
Carrillo,which, as discussed, only focused on the nature of the conviction, not the sentence.
98. United States v. Carrillo, 991 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1993).
99. Pinion, 4 F.3d at 945.
100. United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 562 (4th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 560.
102. Id. at 560; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d)(1)-(2) (2012)
(distinguishing between "confinement" and "imprisonment").
103. Mason, 284 F.3d at 560.
104. Id. at 562.
105. Id. at 559.
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IV. THE KIDS REALLY ARE DIFFERENT: LARGER JUVENILE JUSTICE
ISSUES IMPLICATED BY THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The implications of this judicial disagreement reach far beyond
the Guidelines themselves. Simply put, harsh sentencing
enhancements do not consider the nature of the offender at the time of
the predicate offenses. In terms of rehabilitation, culpability, and
overall development, juvenile offenders differ from their adult
counterparts. These differences led to the creation of the juvenile
justice system in the first place and, in many ways, are ignored by
wide-reaching transfer statutes that thrust juveniles into adult
court. 1 06 As a result, Courts struggle to uniformly interpret the
Guidelines because the purposes of the career offender enhancements
and a juvenile-specific justice system often diverge. 07
This Part exposes these tensions by analyzing recent judicial
and scientific trends. First, Section A discusses why simply choosing
one side of the circuit split over the other fails to provide a sufficient
solution to this sentencing problem. Then, Section B uses recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence to examine the Court's renewed interest
in protecting the juvenile offender. Finally, Section C discusses the
importance of neuroscience and developmental psychology in
addressing juvenile sentencing.
Since the emergence of this circuit split, significant strides
have been made toward a more lenient view of juvenile offenders.108
This Part will also analyze these developments and show why the line
should not be drawn between adult and juvenile convictions or
sentences, but rather, between adult and juvenile offenders.
A. Why Resolving the CircuitSplit Alone Is Insufficient
Simply adopting the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' approach 09
is not enough to remedy the tension between the Guidelines and the
juvenile justice system. Although the nature-of-the-sentence
106. See supra Parts II.A-B (elaborating on how the inherent differences between juvenile
and adult offenders resulted in the creation of an independent juvenile justice system and
transfer scheme).
107. See supra Parts III.A-B (explaining the circuit split that emerged in attempting to
interpret the Guidelines).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (abolishing juvenile life
without parole for nonhomicide offenses).
109. See supra Part II.C (explaining that the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits analyze both the
nature of the conviction and the sentence in evaluating prior offenses under a career offender
enhancement, creating the possibility that adult convictions that led to juvenile sentencing may
not count against a repeat offender).
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interpretation adopted by these courts purportedly preserves
sentencing uniformity while promoting juvenile justice, 110 in reality, it
does little to accomplish either.' 1 In fact, there is still much disparity
among the states regarding correctional facilities, juvenile transfer
statutes, and the adjudication of juveniles in adult court.112 Beyond its
inability to effect sentencing uniformity, this approach does not serve
the goals of the juvenile justice system; focusing solely on the nature
of the sentence necessarily fails to account for some of the largest
differences between adult and juvenile offenders.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' approach does not remedy
the vast discrepancies between juvenile justice programs across the
states, and thus it would not promote the Guidelines' goal of avoiding
sentencing disparities between defendants convicted of similar
crimes. 113 For example, correctional facilities are not all characterized
as "adult" or "juvenile," creating difficulties in determining what kind
of sentence was served. While the defendant in Mason served a prior
sentence in a juvenile home for boys,114 the defendant in Moorer
served a prior sentence in a facility that housed both older juveniles
and young adults.115 Ultimately, conducting a nature-of-the-sentence
inquiry would neither add any clarity nor guarantee sentence
uniformity.
States also have dramatically different laws for juvenile
transfer and sentencing-differences that cannot be reconciled by
simply inquiring into the nature of a prior sentence." 6 Some states
determine transfer based on age, others based on the nature of the
crime, and others by combining the approaches." 7 These disparities
110. See Shaffer, supra note 77, at 175 (arguing that "[t]he approach of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits best carries out the purpose of the Guidelines, to promote uniformity in
sentencing," and going on to argue additional juvenile justice benefits).
111. See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (refusing to enter
the nature-of-the-sentence debate but nonetheless struggling to determine whether a conviction
was adult or not).
112. See generally supra Part II (discussing some of these jurisdictional discrepancies).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006) (noting that one of the major purposes of the Guidelines is
"avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct").
114. See United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 557 (4th Cir. 2002) (defendant had been
previously confined to the Industrial Home for Boys until he turned eighteen).
115. See United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2004) (defendant had
previously been housed at the Yardville Youth Reception Center, which housed those under and
over age eighteen).
116. See supra Part II.B (providing a more comprehensive discussion of the various
mechanics of transfer laws).
117. See FELD, supra note 9, at 516-23 (describing a sample of transfer statutes and how
they differ across the states).
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affect the makeup of juvenile offenders in the adult systems and the
sentences they receive.118 Further complicating the picture is that
some states allow juveniles transferred to the adult system to be
sentenced as juveniles,119 while others refuse to provide this option.120
A nature-of-the-sentence approach will never help a defendant in one
of these latter jurisdictions, because a prior adult conviction will
always result in an adult sentence.
Moreover, a nature-of-the-sentence approach cannot be used
until the Court determines that the conviction was deemed "adult,"
which is not always a straightforward inquiry.121 Recently, the First
Circuit struggled to reconcile Massachusetts state law with the
Guidelines, ultimately relying on its own intuition to determine that a
prior conviction was not "adult" under § 4B1.2.122 The court altogether
refused to weigh in on the circuit split, opting instead to remand the
case based on its nature-of-the-conviction determination. 123 Thus, even
if a nature-of-the-sentence approach could clarify a particular
application of the Guidelines, determining the nature of the conviction
itself may result in additional confusion.
From a policy perspective, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits'
approach does not adequately advance the goals of the juvenile justice
system.124 For example, recent jurisprudence suggests that to best
preserve the possibility of juvenile rehabilitation, courts should
differentiate between juvenile and adult offenders, rather than
sentences.125 The nature-of-the-sentence approach does nothing to help
the offender who, as a juvenile, was sentenced to an adult facility and
never given the chance to rehabilitate. Merely focusing on which
approach better conforms to the text and purpose of the Guidelines
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-13 (West 2012) (stipulating that if it serves the best
interest of the juvenile andlor the public, adult courts may sentence juvenile offenders to custody
of the Division of Juvenile Services in lieu of sentencing them as adults).
120. See Moorer, 383 F.3d at 169 (concluding that New Jersey did not allow a judge to
impose a juvenile sentence based on an adult conviction for a crime, citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4A-41).
121. See supra Part II.B (explaining the Guidelines and their requirements); see also
UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 411.2 (2012) (requiring a prior adult
conviction as a predicate for the career offender guideline).
122. See United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a prior
conviction was not "adult" per the Guidelines).
123. Id. at 154.
124. See supra Part II.A (discussing rehabilitation as one of the overall purposes of the
juvenile justice system).
125. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 113 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011) (holding that a child's
age properly informs Miranda custody analysis, and tracing the recent increase of cases
differentiating juveniles from adults).
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ignores the fact that perhaps the motivations behind the Guidelines
themselves need to be reevaluated in light of the unique
characteristics of juvenile offenders. 126
B. The Supreme Court and DifferentiatingJuveniles from Adults
In lieu of focusing on juvenile and adult sentences, the
Supreme Court has recently focused on the differences between
juvenile and adult offenders, according juveniles distinct treatment
under the Constitution.127 These cases demonstrate the Court's deep
interest in juvenile justice and its willingness to reframe traditional
constitutional jurisprudence to account for the specific attributes that
set juvenile offenders apart from their adult counterparts. 128 Overall,
the Court has indicated that juvenile offenders are less culpable' 9
and, thus, less deserving of retributive punishment. 130 This
development-driven jurisprudence is gaining more traction, calling
into question whether any sentence served before the age of eighteen
should count toward sentencing enhancements.
Three key cases comprise the Court's recent jurisprudence.
First, Roper v. Simmons struck down the juvenile death penalty.131
Second, Graham v. Florida held that juvenile life-without-parole
sentences are unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses.132 Finally,
Miller v. Alabama struck down mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles, even for homicide crimes.133 These three cases
illustrate the marked distinction between juvenile and adult offenders
and the impropriety of one-size-fits-all sentencing practices.

126. See supra Part II.C (discussing the particular severity of the Career Offender
Guidelines, both in terms of the statutory mandate and the Commission's response).
127. See, e.g., J.D.B., 113 S. Ct. at 2399; see also Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different:
Looking Past Graham v. Florida, CRIM. L. REP., July 12, 2010, at 1, 2 (providing a discussion of
the implications of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on juvenile law doctrines).
128. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (identifying and exploring three
general differences between juveniles under eighteen and adults).
129. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (comparing an adult murderer to a
juvenile nonhomicide offender and finding that the latter has a "twice diminished moral
culpability" due to the natures of the respective ages and crimes).
130. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 ("[T]he case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as
with an adult.. . .").
131. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
132. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
133. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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1. Roper v. Simmons
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court considered the case of
Christopher Simmons, a seventeen-year-old high school junior,
sentenced to death for first-degree murder. 134 The Court struck down
the juvenile death penalty as unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment, 135 finding such young offenders less culpable than adults,
and thus incapable of deserving the harshest penalty that the law can
impose.136 Informed by medical, psychological, and sociological studies,
the Court articulated three general differences between juveniles and
adults. 137 First, juveniles are less mature and have an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness and a relative lack of
forethought. 138 Second, juveniles are more vulnerable to negative
influences and peer pressure because they have less control over their
own environments. 1 39 Third, a juvenile's personality and character are
more transitory and less fixed than an adult's. 140 These differences
reduce the culpability of juvenile offenders and "render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders."14 1
The Court cited these differences to underscore why traditional
sentencing and punishment justifications do not apply to juveniles
with the same force. Retribution is not proportional if the most severe
penalty is "imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity." 142 Furthermore, imposing the most final and irrevocable
penalty on an offender with the capacity for significant mental
maturation and change seems inherently inappropriate. 143 An
additional justification for the death penalty-deterrence-is similarly
inapplicable: juvenile offenders are less likely to weigh the costs and

134. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57.
135. Id. at 579 (holding that the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment).
136. Id. at 568-79.
137. Id. at 569.
138. Id. (noting that almost every state addressed this impetuousness by prohibiting those
under eighteen from drinking, voting, or serving on juries).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 570.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 571.

143. See Levick, supra note 127, at 2 (remarking that the Court had stressed this
incongruity).
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benefits of their actions and are unlikely to be deterred by the threat
of a punishment so remote that it barely exists in their minds. 144
The Roper Court additionally emphasized the force of these
developmental differences by categorically applying its holding to all
offenders under the age of eighteen, regardless of the particular
details of their crimes.145 That the brutality or cold-blooded nature of a
crime could supersede the juvenile offender's age was "unacceptable"
to the majority,146 who refused to rely on unproven medical attempts
to distinguish a juvenile offender who could be rehabilitated from one
who could not.147 The Court stressed that the state could not revoke a
juvenile's "potential to attain a mature understanding of his own
humanity,"148 reemphasizing the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders.
2. Graham v. Florida
In Graham v. Florida, the Court further developed its view
that juveniles and adults are fundamentally different.149 Considering
the case of Terrance Graham, convicted of armed burglary, the Court
held that the Constitution prohibited juvenile life-without-parole
("JLWOP") sentences for nonhomicide crimes. 50 Building off the
reasoning in Roper,11 the Court argued that juveniles are less
culpable and retain the ability to change, and that JLWOP effectively

144. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988))
(prohibiting the death penalty for any offender under the age of sixteen).
145. Id. at 572-73. This categorical commitment is underscored by the particular crime that
gave rise to the case in Roper. The defendant and a friend, hoping to commit a murder, randomly
broke into the house of the victim, used duct tape to cover her mouth and eyes and to bind her
feet and arms, and took her to a nearby park. Id. at 557. Covering her head with a towel, secured
onto her face with more duct tape, they threw her from a bridge, drowning her in the water
below. Id.
146. Id. at 573.
147. Id. (noting several medical and scientific barriers to this type of distinction, the details
of which will be discussed in more detail later in supraPart IV.C of this Note).
148. Id. at 574; see also Levick, supra note 127, at 2 (providing an overview of the
implications of juvenile treatment after Roper).
149. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
150. See id. at 2034 (holding that where a life sentence is imposed, the State must give the
prisoner "some realistic opportunity to obtain release").
151. See, e.g., id. at 2026 (embracing the same three general differences between juveniles
and adults discussed earlier, and focusing especially on the "twice-diminished" culpability of a
juvenile, nonhomicide offender); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice
Kennedy's Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POI'Y 66, 7172 (2010) (providing an extensive analysis of Justice Kennedy's approach to juvenile offenders
and victims and tracing the similarities between Kennedy's reasoning in Roper and Graham).
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glosses over these differences. 152 No matter what the defendant did to
demonstrate growth and maturity, he would die in prison under his
original sentence. 53 Informed by medical, scientific, and sociological
studies, the Court held that this result violated the Eighth
Amendment.154
Just as in Roper, the Court adopted a categorical ban on
JLWOP for nonhomicide crimes, again demonstrating the overriding
importance of distinguishing juvenile from adult offenders, regardless
of aggravating factors.155 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
seemed particularly concerned by the comments of the trial court
judge who, upon sentencing the defendant (a repeat offender),
observed: "[Y]ou decided that this is how you were going to live your
life and that there is nothing we can do for you ....

[W]e can't help

you any further. We can't do anything to deter you." 15 6 But this is
exactly what the Court sought to avoid-a judge using the fact that
the defendant was a career offender to overlook the notion that he was
just a juvenile and still capable of rehabilitation. Courts cannot
necessarily "distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from
the many that have the capacity for change."15 7
By extending the focus on developmental differences to strike
down nonhomicide JLWOP, the Graham Court solidified the shift
from the nature of the sentence to the nature of the offender. Chief
Justice Roberts, in dissent, noted that the Court had moved beyond its
longstanding view that the "death penalty is different" and had relied
instead on the category of the particular offender. 158 In a separate
dissent, Justice Thomas observed that the Court could now immunize
any class of offenders from any punishment.159 As one commentator

152. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033 (noting that many prisons withhold
rehabilitation and education programs from those sentenced to life without parole).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 2034; see also Arya, supra note 41, at 124 (arguing that Graham establishes
that youth have a constitutional right to rehabilitation because the main holding explicitly
mentions rehabilitation and because the Court refused to use incapacitation as a legitimate goal
for JLWOP).
155. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032; see also Levick, supra note 127, at 2 (providing a nice
synthesis of the holding and reasoning in this case, paying particular attention to how it built off

of Roper).
156. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020 (quoting the record); see also Birckhead, supra note 151, at
72 (discussing the implications of the categorical rules in both Roper and Graham).
157. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
158. Id. at 2039-40 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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has put it, the Court moved from the "death is different" approach to
the "kids are different" approach.o60
3. Miller v. Alabama
In the summer of 2012, the Court once again demonstrated
that juveniles are "constitutionally different"161 from adults when it
struck down mandatory JLWOP sentences altogether. 162 At issue in
Miller were the sentences of two fourteen-year-olds convicted of
homicide crimes: Kuntrell Jackson for felony murder stemming from a
video-store robbery 63 and Evan Miller for murder.164 Despite the
nature of these offenses, the Court invalidated the JLWOP sentences
as unconstitutional because they failed to account for the unique
characteristics of juvenile offenders.s65
Further developing the analysis in Roper and Graham, the
Miller Court took an even more nuanced approach to juvenile
sentencing. First, the Court reemphasized that traditional
justifications for punishment do not neatly apply to juveniles.
Diminished juvenile culpability weakens the case for retribution,
while a juvenile's inherent recklessness makes deterrence unlikely. 66
Moreover, rehabilitation could not justify a sentence of permanent
imprisonment.16 7 Although the Court in Graham drew the line at
nonhomicide crimes, the Miller Court rejected such line drawing.
None of the distinctive traits of juveniles are crime specific;168 rather,
the differences between juveniles and adults demand specialized
consideration by the sentencing authority regardless of the crime. To
further support this point, the Court analogized JLWOP to the death
penalty, which, according to Roper, requires courts to consider the
defendant's youth through individualized sentencing.169 The
"imposition of a state's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders,"
wrote Justice Kagan for the Court, "cannot proceed as though they
were not children." 70
160. Levick, supra note 127, at 3.
161. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (reasoning that, for the purposes of
sentencing, juveniles and adults are constitutionally different).
162. Id. at 2475.
163. Id. at 2461.
164. Id. at 2462.
165. Id. at 2464, 2465, 2475.
166. Id. at 2465.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2467.
170. Id. at 2466.
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The Court also noted that discretionary transfer statutes did
not adequately address the unique characteristics of juvenile
offenders. First, many states actually use mandatory transfer
systems, meaning juveniles in these jurisdictions cannot rely on their
age to avoid adult sentencing schemes.'71 Moreover, even when states
give judges the discretion to transfer, the Court has found limited
utility in such schemes. In Miller, for example, the lower court denied
petitioner's request to have his own mental-health expert at his
transfer hearing, leaving the judge with only partial information
about Miller's background and the circumstances of his offense.1 72
Transfer decisions often leave the judge a choice between the light
punishment of the juvenile system and the standardized sentencing
for adults.173 Since a judge making the transfer decision will likely
determine that a minor deserves a harsher sentence than he would
receive in juvenile court,174 the importance of a sentencing judge's
consideration of juvenile mitigation becomes paramount.
Unlike in Roper or Graham,however, the Court did not adopt a
categorical ban on the juvenile sentencing practice at issue. While the
Court struck down mandatory JLWOP schemes, it still allowed
discretionary JLWOP to continue so long as the sentencing process
took into account "how children are different." 75 This caveat is not as
great a departure from the prior two cases as it may seem, however,
and it still preserves the stark distinctions between juvenile and adult
offenders. First, the Court did not foreclose a categorical ban on
JLWOP, rather it merely determined that this holding was sufficient
to decide the cases at hand. 76 Second, the Court observed that there
would be few cases where JLWOP would ever be imposed, noting the
difficulty in identifying those rare juvenile offenders who are beyond
repair.177 Practically, then, Miller should have the effect of all but
categorically banning JLWOP, preserving the same bright-line
distinctions established in Roper and Graham.
Because of the Court's recent jurisprudence, sentencing
practices that fail to consider the unique nature of the juvenile

171. Id. at 2474.
172. Id.
173. See id. (comparing a release from custody at the age of twenty-one, on the one hand,
with mandatory life without parole on the other).
174. See id. at 2474-75 ("It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a
(much) harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court.. .
175. Id. at 2469.
176. See id. (noting, however, that "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon").
177. Id. (echoing the reasoning of both Roper and Graham).
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offender seem dubious.178 Graham, Roper, and Miller show not only
the Court's different treatment of juveniles and adults, but also its
reluctance to apply harsh sentences for juvenile offenses. This
necessarily implicates Career Offender Guideline enhancements based
on juvenile convictions. Though still several steps removed from the
death penalty or JLWOP, career offender enhancements can still
impose significant penalties on juvenile offenders. 179 Since the
Supreme Court has shown no signs of backing away from its special
treatment of juveniles, 180 it may soon address the question of whether
juvenile sentences can constitutionally impose such punitive
consequences for an offender's entire life.
C. Legal DistinctionBased on Scientific Differences
Modern advances in juvenile science and medicine support the
distinction established in Roper, Graham, and Miller. In recent years,
two trends have developed. First, technology and research can now
more accurately explain the scientific differences between juveniles
and adults with more precision. 181 Second, courts are increasingly
willing to incorporate this science into their decisionmaking. 182 By
continuing to reinforce that juvenile offenders are truly different from
their adult counterparts, these trends will hopefully lead to judicial or
legislative review of the Guidelines in favor of ignoring prior juvenile
sentences in a career offender enhancement.
Since the 1980s, advances in both developmental psychology
and neuroscience have revealed much valuable information about
juveniles. 183 Prior to this period, both fields were relatively primitive,
178. See Birckhead, supra note 151, at 78-79 (exploring the particular characteristics of a
JLWOP that are shared with other sentences).
179. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that the sentence in United States v.
Gregory was enhanced from 130 months to 327 months).
180. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (holding for the first
time that Miranda custody analysis must take into account a juvenile's age).
181. See, e.g., Johanna Cooper Jennings, Note, Juvenile Justice,Sullivan, and Graham: How

the Supreme Court's Decision Will Change the Neuroscience Debate, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
no. 6, at 1 (providing an overview of advances in neuroscience and their potential effects on the
Supreme Court).
182. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (referring expressly to
developments in psychology and brain science that demonstrate fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds). But see Terry Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent
Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 117 (2009) (commenting that
neuroscience currently has only a buttressing effect on information considered by the courts).
183. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 96-97; 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the
"Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2007) (discussing the growing
use of brain imaging technology to explore legally relevant behavior).

1334

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:4:1309

focusing almost exclusively on very young children rather than
adolescent development.184 But in the 1980s, scientists began studying
teenagers much more comprehensively, assessing their different risktaking behaviors, attitudes toward authority, and decisionmaking
processes.185 In the early 1990s, advances in technology revolutionized
the way neuroscientists studied the juvenile brain, culminating in
several well-known studies that revealed adolescent brains are still
developing.186 By the turn of the century, these studies supported the
idea that teenage brains are structurally and functionally different
from those of adults. 87
In Roper, the Court relied on this twenty-year surge in
scientific research to articulate the three general differences between
juveniles and adults. 88 Though the full extent of its influence is
unclear, many scholars regarded this case as a breakthrough for the
reliance on developmental psychology and neuroscience in juvenile
justice.'89 Both the defense's oral arguments' 90 and the amicus brief
from the American Medical Association' 9 ' stressed the importance of
psychology and neuroscience in the legal field. This clearly influenced
the Court, which cited several medical studies in its opinion.192 Justice
Scalia also acknowledged the Court's extensive reliance on "scientific

184. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 96-97 (providing an overview of developmental
psychology and neuroscience, and their relationship to judges and policymakers).
185. Id. at 97.
186. See id. at 98 (discussing the studies in more detail and explaining the scientific studies
in more detail); Snead, supra note 183, at 1273 (tracing the growth of cognitive neuroscience in
the 1990s); Jennings, supra note 181, at 6 (explaining the science behind the determinations of
these MRI and fMRI studies).
187. Maroney, supra note 182, at 100.
188. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); see also supra notes 137-41 and
accompanying text (enumerating and discussing these three differences).
189. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 108 ("Developmental neuroscience thus became to be
regarded . . . as a major influence on the highest-profile juvenile case in decades."); Jennings,
supra note 181, at 22 (noting that the "door for neuroscientific research opened in Roper" will
help juvenile advocates further reform the system).
190. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (statement
of Seth Waxman) ("[W]here you have a scientific community that in Stanford was absent-the
American Medical Association, the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, the major medical and scientific associations, were not able in 1989,
based on the evidence, to come to this Court and say there is scientific, empirical validation for
requiring that the line be set at 18.").
191. See Brief for the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2,
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) ("The adolescent's mind works differently from ours.
Parents know it. This Court has said it. Legislatures have presumed it for decades or more. And
now, new scientific evidence sheds light on the differences.").
192. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing several developmental psychology studies).
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and sociological studies," though he argued that such studies should
be considered by the legislatures, not the courts.193
Despite Justice Scalia's admonition, the Court again turned to
science when striking down JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses in
Graham. Even more explicitly than in Roper, the Court based its
decision in Graham on the fact that "developments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds." 19 4 The Court further noted that those parts
of the brain that control behavior continue to develop through
adolescence and that psychologists themselves could not differentiate
between those offenders who were "irreparabl[y] corrupt" and those
who merely demonstrated juvenile folly. 195 In case Roper left any
doubts, the Court's opinion in Graham unequivocally supported the
use of developmental psychology and neuroscience to differentiate
juvenile offenders from their adult counterparts.
Though much remains to be seen, current trends point toward
an increased, albeit measured, use of science and medicine in the
courtroom. The Supreme Court again acknowledged the
developmental differences between juveniles and adults in J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, noting that cognitive science confirms what was
established in Roper and Graham.196 And it echoed this approach in
Miller when it relied on developments in psychology and brain science
to identify the attributes that distinguish young people from adults. 97
Furthermore, state courts have relied on these developmental
principles when confronting particularly long juvenile sentences. One
court turned to the "scientific and sociological studies" cited in Roper
to decline a sentencing restriction on a juvenile's eligibility for
parole. 98 Another discussed the significant differences between the
adolescent and adult brain, acknowledging that the defendant's

193. See id. at 617-18 (stating that "1]egislatures 'are better qualified to weigh and
"evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a
flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts"'" (citing McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987))).
194. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
195. Id.
196. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403, n.5 (2011) (holding that a Miranda custody analysis must take
into account a juvenile's age and echoing the determination in Graham that no recent scientific
data contradicts the notion that juvenile offenders are developmentally different from adult
offenders).
197. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
198. See Cotting v. State, No. A-9909, 2008 WL 4059580, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 3,
2008) (upholding a sentencing in which the trial judge considered the "literature regarding
juveniles" that was relied on in Roper).
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"thinking" was in development when he committed the offense, which
counseled in favor of a sentence well below the maximum. 199
The judiciary's increased willingness to consider scientific
literature on adolescence suggests that the significance of juvenile
offenses will decrease in the eyes of the law. This, in turn, should
dramatically decrease the role they play in the Career Offender
Guidelines. Though some scholars doubt courts will use adolescent
brain research to mitigate juvenile sentencing practices, 200 others
believe that the holdings of Roper, Graham, and Miller strengthen the
possibility that science will affect juvenile justice policy in the
future. 201 And even the detractors acknowledge that, at a minimum,
the ongoing progress in brain science will buttress the notion that
juveniles and adults should be sentenced differently.2 02 Based on these
recent trends, it seems reasonable to conclude that science will
eventually impact the effect of juvenile sentences on career offender
enhancements.
V. CEMENTING THE LINE IN THE SAND

The debate over the Career Offender Guidelines emerged
during one of the most reactive times in the history of juvenile
justice 203-before the Supreme Court decided its recent trio of cases
and began relying on newly developed scientific evidence. 204 Roper,

199. See State v. Carrasquillo, 962 A.2d 772, 775-78 (Conn. 2009).
200. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 124-28 (providing an overview of juvenile challenges
to lengthy or harsh sentences and determining that pre-Graham, most challenges were
unsuccessful).
201. See Jennings, supra note 181, at 21-22 (predicting the effects of Graham's categorical
ban on JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses).
202. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 167 ("If this minor buttressing role is less spectacular
than some would hope, it is a real one. More, this role could expand if the science eventually
were to show stronger connections between neural structure, neural functioning, and
externalized behaviors.").
203. As previously discussed, from the 1970s until the turn of the century, courts and
legislatures cracked down on youth violence as a result of the growing drug trade. See FELD,
supra note 9, at 29 (describing the " 'get tough' crime policies that affected juvenile justice
administration throughout the nation").
204. Roper was decided in 2005, Graham in 2010, and Miller in 2012. All but one of the
circuit court cases (United States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010)) were decided before
2005. United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555
(4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carrillo, 991 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pinion, 4
F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 1993). Even those cases decided after Roper considered prior sentences
originally handed down during this same time period, which were subject to the same precedent
and general public opinion. See, e.g., Moorer, 383 F.3d at 166 (stating that the disputed
conviction and sentence took place in 1990); Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 4, Gregory, 591 F.3d
964 (No. 09-2735), 2009 WL 3459293 (stating that the disputed robbery had taken place in 2000).
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Graham, and Miller demonstrate the Court's renewed focus on
protecting the juvenile offender. 205 These cases cannot be
circumscribed to the juvenile death penalty or JLWOP; rather, they
broadly implicate the differences between juvenile and adult offenders
and call into question sentencing practices that treat them uniformly.
It is clear, then, that enhancements based on a minor's prior
convictions in adult court need to be reevaluated in light of these
recent trends.
This Note proposes that a court should not use any conviction
prior to the age of eighteen as a predicate offense for a later career
offender enhancement, regardless of whether the conviction and/or
sentence have been deemed "adult." Admittedly, this approach is a far
cry from where the law currently stands, and it would require
amending the Guidelines. 206 But, the Career Offender Guidelines were
created during an anti-juvenile period, 207 and the Commission itself
recently acknowledged that the Guidelines result in unjustly severe
sentences. 208 The solution advocated here looks beyond the semantic
argument taken up by the courts of appeals that resulted in the
and
nature-of-the-sentence
nature-of-the-conviction
divergent
approaches.
Instead, it recognizes that the more apt distinction is between
juvenile and adult offenders and that any sentencing scheme that fails
to take this into account is fundamentally unfair, particularly given
the harsh consequences involved. Excluding all juvenile crimes from
career offender calculations provides a bright-line sentencing rule that
is consistent with existing state law, recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, developmental science, and the overall goals of the
juvenile justice system.
It is worth noting at the outset that this approach has already
been implemented in some jurisdictions, suggesting its viability as a
solution to the problem of juvenile sentencing. Certain states
categorically refuse to apply prior convictions below a certain age to
state career offender enhancements. 209 For example, Oregon draws the

205. For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part IV.B.
206. For example, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2, and 4A1.2 would
now have to provide more nuanced definitions of "prior felony conviction" and "adult conviction"
to incorporate this new requirement.
207. They were created as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et
seq. (2006). See supra Part II.C (discussing the origins of the Guidelines).
208. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (corroborating this point).
209. See Deutsch, supra note 8, at 390 (breaking down various state approaches to habitual
offender statutes, paying particular attention to how convictions before the age of eighteen affect
these sentencing enhancements).
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line at sixteen, while New Mexico and North Dakota prohibit the use
of any prior convictions before eighteen. 210 None of these states rely on
the nature of the conviction or the sentence. 211 And as more states
begin to recognize the unique nature of adolescence, it is likely that
more will come to adopt similar practices.
From a practical standpoint, this solution provides a judicially
manageable test that will promote uniformity in sentencing. Courts
currently struggle to distinguish juvenile convictions from adult
convictionS212 and juvenile sentences from adult sentences. 213 The
approach advocated here merely requires that the court determine an
offender's age at the time the crime was committed. Such a categorical
limitation takes much of the guesswork out of interpreting the
Guidelines, rendering moot the vast jurisdictional discrepancieS214
that have led judges to throw up their hands and make "judgment
calls" when attempting to parse statutory language. 215 Ultimately,
simplicity in judicial application will facilitate the Commission's goal
of sentencing uniformity. 216
Beyond judicial manageability, this solution best reflects the
Supreme Court's recent approach toward juvenile justice sentencing.
The Court continues to rely on the differences between juveniles and
adults to strike down harsh sentencing practices, establishing
essentially two classes of offenders. 217 There are several reasons for
such a distinction, not the least of which is that juvenile offenders
210. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23(C) (West 2009) ("For the purpose of this section, a
violent felony conviction incurred by a defendant before the defendant reaches the age of
eighteen shall not count as a violent felony conviction."); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-09(1)(c)
(West 2011) ("The court may not make such a finding unless the offender is an adult and has
previously been convicted in any state or states or by the United States of two felonies of class C
or above committed at different times when the offender was an adult."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
161.725(3)(a) (West 2008) ("An offense committed when the defendant was less than 16 years of
age .... .").
211. See supranote 210 (providing text of the statutes).
212. See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 156, 158 (1st Cir. 2011)
(demonstrating the difficulty in determining whether a conviction can be characterized as
"adult").
213. See supra Part III (discussing the circuit split over how to interpret the Guidelines in
terms of the nature of the sentence).
214. See supra Part IV.A (briefly discussing the existence of state-to-state disparities
between correctional facilities, juvenile transfer statutes, and the ability to sentence a juvenile in
adult court to a juvenile facility).
215. See, e.g., McGhee, 651 F.3d at 158 (using this term when trying to parse not only the
language of the Guidelines but also the language of the state statute at issue).
216. See supra note 72 (stating that avoiding sentencing disparities is a major purpose of the
Guidelines).
217. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the three major cases contributing to this judicial
recognition).
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have a "diminished moral culpability." 2 18 As a result, the Court has
required states to consider youthfulness when imposing lengthy prison
termS 219 and has on three separate occasions found that juveniles are
categorically exempt from harsh sentencing schemes. 220 The current
Career Offender Guidelines impose some of the harshest sentences
with no consideration of the age at which predicate offenses were
committed. It is feasible, then, that the Court could extend its
reasoning and decide to preclude any predicate offenses committed
when the offender was under eighteen from a career offender
calculation.
A categorical ban on using predicate convictions is also
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, even
though Miller refused to ban JLWOP altogether. First, in both
Graham and Roper the Court specifically relied on the differences
between juveniles and adults to categorically strike down the juvenile
death penalty and JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses. 221 Second, the
Court in Miller did not rule out the possibility of a categorical ban and
further suggested that JLWOP would rarely, if ever, be imposed. 222
Finally, the Court has emphasized that judges cannot sufficiently
identify those juvenile offenders without the capacity for
rehabilitation, 223 so how can we expect a sentencing judge, many years
later, to make an individualized determination about the offender
when he was a juvenile? Ultimately, a categorical approach recognizes
judges' inabilities to make such distinctions and instead opts for the
certainty and predictability that a bright-line rule provides.

218. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
219. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012) (stating that the mandatory
penalty scheme at issue in the case contravened the Court's jurisprudence because it removed
youth from the balance).
220. See supra Part IV (noting that the juvenile death penalty, JLWOP for nonhomicide
crimes, and mandatory JLWOP are all unconstitutional).
221. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030-32 (opining that a categorical ban was necessary
because alternative approaches were not adequate to address constitutional concerns); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573-74 (2005) (arguing that if it is difficult "even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects an unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption," then states should not ask judges or jurors to issue a condemnation as grave as the
death penalty).
222. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 ("[G]iven all [the Court] ha[s] said in Roper, Graham, and
this decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, [the
Court] think[s] appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty
will be uncommon.").
223. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 ("[I]t does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case
proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile
offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.").
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Some might argue that transfer statues adequately account for
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders, but Miller holds
otherwise, and empirical data further undermines this argument. As
the Court noted in its opinion, mandatory transfer statutes ignore the
characteristics of the juvenile offender, and discretionary schemes
likewise do little to account for these factors. 224 Furthermore, transfer
statutes actually exacerbate crime rates. In 2007, the Center for
Disease Control found that juveniles transferred to the adult system
were approximately thirty-four percent more likely to be rearrested for
violent crimes than those who were not transferred. 225 The U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention determined that a significant factor driving these higher
recidivism rates was the stigma and resentment that juveniles
experience when they are convicted as felons and punished as
adults.226 Such problems with transfer schemes may be decreased if
the conviction can no longer be used to enhance subsequent sentences.
This solution is also consistent with developmental psychology
and neuroscience. Juveniles take more risks, blindly follow their
peers, and inadequately consider future repercussions.2 2 Their brains
are structurally and functionally different, and the areas that control
impulse, reasoning, and judgment are still developing during
adolescence,228 and the courts have taken notice.229 These scientific

224. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474 (describing how discretion has limited utility because (a)
"the decisionmaker typically will have only partial information at this early, pre-trial stage about
either the child or the circumstances of his offense" and (b) "the question at transfer hearings
may differ dramatically from the issue at a post-trial sentencing").
225. Angela McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the
Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. s7, s14 (2007).
226. RICHARD E. REDDING, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO
DELINQUENCY? 7 (2010).

227. See Maroney, supra note 182, at 96-97 (discussing the empirical findings of many
developmental studies in the 1980s).
228. Jennings, supra note 181, at 1; see also Maroney, supra note 182, at 100 (comparing the
brains of teenagers with those of both children and adults).
229. E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (noting that advances in science
have led to the discovery that "parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence"); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (stating that studies of
juveniles "tend to confirm a lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility"); State
v. Carrasquillo, 962 A.2d 772, 775-78 (Conn. 2009) (describing the testimony of a psychiatrist
who stated that "new technologies have revealed significant differences between the adolescent
brain and the adult brain, including differences in psychosocial functioning"; at sentencing, the
judge stated that he accepted the testimony and took age into consideration as a mitigating
factor).
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findings support the wisdom of criminal justice policies that, like this
Note's solution, treat juveniles and adults differently.230
Finally, this solution accounts for the goals of juvenile justice,
which recently returned to prominence via the Supreme Court.23 1
Juvenile justice focuses on rehabilitation and emphasizes diminished
culpability,
while
the
Career
Offender
Guidelines
are
uncharacteristically punitive 232 and undeniably retributive. 233 By
removing juvenile convictions from the reach of the Guidelines, the
solution proposed here avoids a conflict between the purposes of these
two practices. 234
VI. CONCLUSION

In the 1980s and 1990s, both the federal and state
governments "got tough" on juvenile "super predators." Among the
broad, retributive policies enacted during this period was the creation
of the Career Offender Guidelines, promulgated under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. As interpreted by several federal circuits,
these Guidelines recommend draconian enhancements based on prior
juvenile convictions in adult court. In some circuits, a thirty-dollar
theft, committed as a juvenile with a sentence served in a juvenile
facility, can lead to a twenty-year enhancement on a later sentence.
The solution to this overly severe sentencing practice is more
complicated than just adopting the minority interpretation of the
current circuit split. Rather, the solution lies in reevaluating the
Career Offender Guidelines altogether in light of a recent return to
the policies that originally undergirded the juvenile justice system. In
Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Supreme Court solidified its policy of
treating juveniles differently by striking down the application of harsh
sentences to juvenile offenders. This jurisprudential move has been

230. See supra note 202 (discussing the buttressing role of brain science).
231. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 ("The state has denied him any chance to later
demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime he committed
while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.").
232. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (explaining the origin of the Career
Offender Guidelines).
233. See, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2012)
(identifying one of the rationales behind the career offender Guidelines as the limited likelihood
of rehabilitation); see also United States v. Carrillo, 991 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that especially punitive career offender enhancements are justified because repeat offenders are
likely beyond the reaches of rehabilitation).
234. For a good analysis of this argument, see Goldstein-Breyer, supra note 14, at 94-95,
discussing the use of juvenile adjudications in California Three-Strike statutes and pointing out
the inherent tension between retribution and rehabilitation.
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buttressed by recent developments in both psychology and
neuroscience.
Precluding the use of convictions prior to age eighteen as
predicate offenses under the Career Offender Guidelines is consistent
with this trend. Amending the Guidelines in the name of workable
judicial standards, sentencing uniformity, recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and developmental science does not set the bar
prohibitively high. In fact, similar schemes have already been
implemented. To be sure, politicians always fear being labeled "weak
on crime." Nevertheless, as the nation's highest court continues to chip
away at harsh sentences for juvenile offenses, public support for
juvenile-friendly policies like the solution proposed in this Note will
grow. Perhaps then our criminal justice system will finally reflect
what the scientists have known for some time now-the kids really
are different.
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